























Abstract - In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between social capital and the 
supply of labor. We identify social capital with non-market relationships. Data are obtained from 
the US General Social Survey for the period 1976-2004. We find evidence that social capital affects 
the supply of labor. In particular non-instrumental relations reduce the supply of labor, whereas 
instrumental relations increase it. Moreover, there are substantial differences between men and 
women: social capital has a greater impact on the labor supply of women. Our findings suggest that 
Putnam’s thesis that the decline of US social capital is largely due to the increase in participation of 
women to the labor market may be partly reversed: the decline of US intrinsic social capital has 
fostered women’s labor market participation.  
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What is the impact of social capital on the labor supply? We try to answer this question by 
regressing the hours worked by individuals on proxies of their social capital along with controls for 
wage and demographic factors. We use more than 20 thousand observations from the American 
General Social Survey (GSS) for the period 1976-2004. We test if the social context affects labor 
supply decision with particular attention to differences between: i) men and women, and ii) 
instrumental and non-instrumental relationships. 
This kind of work is unprecedented.
1 We found no empirical work regressing hours worked 
on social capital. The literature on social capital has concentrated on other economic effects of 
social capital, particularly those on growth and economic performance. The prevalent opinion 
emphasizes a positive effect of social capital on growth. According to Putnam, “norms and 
networks of civic engagement contribute to economic prosperity and are in turn reinforced by that 
prosperity” (1993, pg. 180), and social capital produces “aggregate economic growth” (2000, pg. 
322-3).
2 
However, the empirical evidence in favor of a positive role of social capital on growth seems 
weak. Cross-sectional studies appear to show the existence of a positive relationship between social 
capital (generally measured in terms of generalized trust and associational activity) and economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer (1997) La Porta et al., (1997), Keefer and Zak (2002), Beugelsdijk et al., 
(2004), Beugelsdijk and Schaik (2005)). These studies have been subject, however, to severe 
criticism (Durlauf (2002), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004)).
3,4 
                                                 
1   Bowles and Park (2005), Schor (1991) and Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) have investigated the social 
context of the labor supply following Veblen’s ideas on the role of social comparisons in determining consumption and 
work decisions. Instead, we focus on a different aspect of the social determinants of the labor supply: the role of social 
capital. The difference with respect to the Veblenian approach is that variations in the access to social capital by an 
individual imply variations in his/her absolute position, not in his/her relative one.  
2   Particular attention has been given to the study of a channel through which social capital can have an influence 
on growth, i.e. the facilitation of cooperation mainly through the reduction of transitional costs. See, for example, the 
approach of the so-called “new economic sociology” (see Woolcock (1998)), according to which the members of 
communities with high stocks of social capital tend to be more able to, without cost, monitor one another’s behavior, 
reach informal understandings and agreements, enforce contracts, resolve disputes amicably. In such communities, one 
would expect a low incidence of litigation, corruption, conflicts and crime.  
3   Even admitting the existence of a positive cross-sectional relationship between social capital and income, 
other studies find evidence of a reverse causation going from economic growth to social capital, since they do not find 
that high initial levels of social capital are good predictors of future economic development (see Miguel et al. (2002)).  
4   Furthermore, some macroscopic episodes raise doubts regarding a positive vision of the role of social capital 
on growth. How can one conciliate such a vision with the alarm raised by Putnam himself on the decline of social 
capital in the US? Especially in the 1990s, this fall in social capital does not appear to have been paralleled by a decline 
in the U.S. potential for economic growth. According to Durlauf, Putnam “finds no relationship between the speed of 
the decline of social capital and economic performance across U.S. states or across time periods. Further, the 
relationship between social capital and socioeconomic outcomes is even harder to characterize when one looks at sub-
periods. For example, the 1990s were a period of rapid economic growth in the U.S. yet it is also a period of rapid  
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Other authors have stressed the “downside” of social capital (see Olson (1982), Portes and 
Landolt (1996), Stolle and Rochon (1998), Knack (2003)): strong and long-standing groups may 
hinder growth either through their rent-seeking activities aimed at controlling a disproportionately 
large share of domestic resources, or by placing heavy obligations on members that make it more 
difficult for them to increase their economic opportunities by joining larger social networks. With 
regard to this point, one can fruitfully distinguish between “bridging” social capital – which is 
generated in networks spanning different communities and may be positive for growth – and 
“bonding” social capital – which arises among close friends or members of the same family and is 
generally negative for growth. 
A couple of empirical studies have explicitly referred to the relationship between work hours 
and social capital. Putnam’s study (2000) indicates the increase in female participation in the labor 
market among the causes of the declining trends of social capital. This effect is due to the time 
constraint. More time devoted to market activities implies less time devoted to social activities. 
Costa and Kahn (2003) confirm that “women’s growing commitment to careers may therefore play 
a role in declines in social capital” (p. 40). However, the evidence provided by Putnam (2000) and 
Costa and Kahn (2003) is weak. It is largely based on descriptive statistics and does not allow one 
to draw any conclusion on causality among variables.  
The relationship between social capital and the labor supply has been investigated in the 
context of growth modeling of the happiness paradox (e.g the stability or decline of self-reported 
well-being in the Western world in the last decades) based on the decline of social capital 
(Bartolini-Bonatti (2002, 2003, 2007)). They show that a decrease in social capital may boost the 
labor supply and that, at the same time, a greater supply of labor may decrease social capital. This 
result is obtained within endogenous or exogenous growth models. Social capital is modeled as a 
homogenous quantity and a public good that enters the utility or the production functions of 
individuals. Social capital is subject to negative externalities, which increase with the activity level. 
This is meant to represent the damages brought to social assets by the expansion of the market 
sphere of economic activity (Polanyi (1946), Hirsch (1976)). In this context, individuals are 
increasingly forced to rely on market goods in order to compensate for the negative impact that a 
decline in social capital exerts on their production or utility functions. This compensation is 
financed with more labor. Therefore, a decline in social capital increases both the labor supply and 
the activity level (or the steady state growth rate). Growth in turn, increases the negative 
externalities affecting social capital, feeding back the growth mechanism. Thus, the uncoordinated 
                                                                                                                                                                  
decline in social capital, at least based on the sorts of measures he uses. To be clear, Putnam does attempt to associate 
higher social capital with better socioeconomic outcomes, our point is that the relationship between the two for the 
United States is even at first glance relatively complicated” (p. 12).    
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efforts of individuals to escape from social degradation feed a self-reinforcing growth mechanism, 
which leads to over-work, over-consumption and more social degradation. Decline in social capital 
generates growth and the long-term stability or decline of well-being, which are the stylized facts 
described by the happiness paradox. Growth is seen as a substitution process whereby private goods 
progressively replace the use of common ones, either in the production process or in consumption. 
In this context, the need to finance such a substitution is seen as an important factor in boosting the 
labor supply. In turn, an increase in the labor supply slows down social capital by increasing 
production and consumption. So both relationships are at work in Bartolini-Bonatti’s models: the 
kind of causation stressed by Putnam and a reverse causation running from social capital to the 
labor supply. In this paper, we focus on the extent of the latter causation.  
It is, however, worth noting that, apart from questions concerning the kind of causation that 
explains a negative correlation between social capital and the labor supply, it is not obvious that 
more work goes with  less social capital. The workplace may be the principal locus of socialization 
and students familiar with labor sociology often tend to have this idea. A consequent prediction is 
that a positive correlation between hours worked and social capital should be observed. 
Social capital trends in the US during the last 5 decades have been the object of a lively 
debate raised by Putnam (Putnam (2000), and for a concise survey see Stolle and Hooghe (2004). 
His evidence has been criticized by Ladd (1996) and then carefully scrutinized for the variable used 
and the period considered by Paxton (1999), Robinson and Jackson (2001), and Costa and Kahn 
(2003). On balance, social capital has been confirmed as declining in the US, although not so 
dramatically as Putnam claimed.  
Since our results show that social capital affects the market hours worked, they also suggest 
that trends in social capital may be connected to trends in hours worked. This may contribute to 
solve one of the main puzzles of the happiness literature (Easterlin (1974), (1995)). How to 
reconcile the evidence of a declining trend of happiness in US (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004) – 
despite an increasing trend of income – with the evidence of a rising trend in market hours worked 
in the last 30 years in the US (Schor (1991), Aguiar and Hurst (2006))? Why do Americans strive so 
much for money if money cannot buy happiness? In the light of other results showing that the 
decline in social capital is a major determinant of the US decrease in reported well-being (Bartolini, 
Bilancini and Pugno 2007), one may suggest that the decline of social capital may contribute to 
explain both trends in happiness and hours worked.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define concepts and variables. Section 3 
illustrates our data and empirical strategy. Section 4 is devoted to the estimation of the impact of 




2. Theoretical framework: social capital, relations, motivations 
Social capital (SC) is a rather vague concept and scholars often give different meanings to it. In this 
paper, by SC we mean the stock of non-market relationships that affect the return of available 
resources, either in physical or utility terms.  
We further distinguish between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated SC. The concept of 
extrinsic motivations refers to the incentives coming from outside an individual. By contrast, major 
psychological schools emphasize the intrinsic motives coming from within an individual. 
According to Deci (1971, pg. 105), “one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity 
when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself”. Notice that Deci’s definition 
concentrates on the non-instrumental nature of intrinsically motivated activities which directly enter 
the utility functions of individuals. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is a 
well-established concept in social sciences. Various empirical studies in psychology have found that 
extrinsic motivations can crowd out intrinsic ones. This has given rise to a lively debate in 
psychology (Sansone and Harackievicz, 2000) but it has also attracted interest among economists 
(Frey (1997), Benabou and Tirole (2003), Kreps (1997)). 
Notice that, according to such a distinction, instrumental relations are not exhausted by 
market relations. In fact, also non-market relations can be extrinsically motivated. Therefore, we 
adopt the following definitions. By intrinsic social capital we mean the component of SC that 
enters into people's utility functions. By extrinsic social capital we mean the component of SC that 
does not directly enter into people's utility functions but is instrumental to something else that may 
be considered valuable. 
The economic importance of  intrinsically motivated relationships has been emphasized using 
the term relational goods. 
5  In the following we will adopt the terminology ‘intrinsic social capital’ 
interchangeably with ‘relational goods’. 
The framework outlined above allows a new interpretation of the relationship between social 
capital and the growth of a market economy. According to a long standing tradition, the 
individualistic and competitive values system connected with the expansion of a market economy 
may slow down the formation of social assets ((see Hirsch (1976), Hirschman (1982) Polanyi 
(1946)). However, it is not clear which part of social capital should be negatively affected. 
Moreover, while some parts of social capital are negatively affected, others may be enhanced by the 
                                                 
5  Uhlaner (1989), Gui and Sugden (2005), Bruni and Stanca (2007). Some studies show their positive impact on 
reported well-being, as Bruni and Stanca 2005. Helliwell 2006 and  Helliwell and Putnam 2004 show similar results 




market expansion. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic SC suggests a new approach to 
this issue. Market relations are definitely instrumental and, hence, extrinsic. As market relations 
expand alongside the growth process, intrinsic motivations may be crowded out by extrinsic ones 
through a change in the frame of social relations. Therefore, growth may decrease intrinsic SC 
while increasing extrinsic SC. This mechanism can be modeled as negative motivational 
externalities (as in Bartolini and Bonatti (2007)) attached to growth, which affect non-instrumental 
SC. 
We now turn to the practical meaning that we give to SC in this paper. Our proxies of SC are 
marital status, social contacts, trust in individuals, membership in various groups and organizations, 
watching TV.  Since marital status is obviously a relational variable we include it among SC 
indicators, although it is not always considered a social capital variable. Moreover, it is an 
important source of information on the family, which, according to Putnam (2000), is considered 
one of the main sources of social capital. We further classify marital status and social contacts (with 
neighbors, friends, relatives, in bars and taverns) as indicators of intrinsic SC. Besides possible 
extrinsic motivations, their intrinsic nature should be obvious enough. In the following, we illustrate 
why we also consider membership in some groups, watching TV and trust in individuals as 
indicators of relational goods. 
Membership in groups and organizations is widely considered to be a good indicator of 
relational activities (also referred to as “weak ties” in the social capital literature (Olson (1982), 
Putnam (2000), Costa and Khan (2003), Sabatini (2006)). Notice that the risk that group 
membership also captures non-relational aspects is smaller than for any other SC variable available 
in the GSS. Moreover, given the different nature of the various groups and organizations, we can 
attempt a distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated group memberships. For this 
purpose, we sort groups into two main categories, which we call, following the intuition of Knack 
(2003),  Putnam’s groups and Olson’s groups. The distinction between Olson’s and Putnam’s 
groups is based on the classic works of Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993). They provide conflicting 
views on the impact of private associations on economic performance and social conflict. Olson 
(1982) emphasized the tendency of associations to act as ‘distributional coalitions’ which lobby for 
policies that protect the interest of special groups at the expenses of the society as a whole. Since 
these ‘distributional coalitions’ impose large costs to the rest of the society they negatively impact 
on economic growth. Growth-inhibiting policies such as tariffs, tax breaks, competition-reducing 
regulations or subsidies are the undesirable result of the lobbying activity of associations. Instead, 
according to Putnam (1993) associations are a source of general trust and social ties leading to 
governmental and economic efficiency. These different views motivated empirical tests aimed at  
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verifying if different horizontal associations, called Olsonian and Putnamian, have a different 
impact on economic growth (Knack (2003), Gleaser et al. (2000)). 
In this paper membership in a Putnam group is interpreted as intrinsic SC, while membership 
in an Olson group is interpreted as extrinsic SC. In other words, membership in Putnam’s groups is 
supposed to be mostly experienced for the pleasure of being a member (e.g. the pleasure derived by 
the idea of acting together with other individuals towards a common aim, the pleasure of interacting 
with people having the same tastes, etc.). Instead, membership in Olson’s groups is supposed to be 
experienced only for instrumental reasons (e.g. rent-seeking). Among Putnam’s groups we include 
service groups, church organizations, sports clubs, art and literature clubs, national organizations, 
hobby clubs, fraternal groups and youth associations. Among Olson’s groups we include fraternity 
associations, unions, professional organizations and farm organizations. Three groups were left 
unclassified and we put them under the label of Other groups. We do this because it is not clear 
whether these groups constitute intrinsic SC or not. Among such Other groups we put veterans 
associations, political parties and “other groups” (the latter is the label used in the GSS for groups 
that do not fall under any of the types otherwise described).
6  
We also classify indicators of trust in individuals – i.e. reports of general perceived 
trustworthiness, helpfulness and fairness – as indicators of intrinsic SC. They can be interpreted as 
judgments about the behavior of others, which stem from the quality of individuals' actual 
relationships. In other words, we posit that people judge that others are trustworthy or helpful on the 
basis of their actual experiences and that these relationships are more likely to be based on trust and 
mutual help when they are intrinsically motivated. This does not exclude extrinsic motivations but 
requires intrinsic ones to play an important role.   
Finally, we consider the number of hours spent watching TV as a proxy for both the quantity 
and the quality of relational activities, namely as a negative indicator of SC. Apart from the time 
constraint – which reasonably supports our interpretation – we also suppose that individuals 
spending much time watching TV are less engaged, on average, in their relational activities and, in 
particular, those that are intrinsically motivated (Bruni and Stanca (2006)). The basic idea is that 
watching TV reduces relational activities and that intrinsic relations are more elastic to watching 
TV than extrinsic ones. 
 
                                                 
6   Knack (2003) does not refer to intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Moreover, the types of groups recognized in the 
GSS do not coincide with those recognized in the database used by Knack (2003) so our classifications are partly 
different. However, these are not the only reasons for the minor differences between Knack's classification and ours. 
Some further changes are due to a different interpretation: groups whose main objective is to foster collective actions do 
not necessarily fall in the Olson category. For instance, we put political parties among Other groups – and not among 
Olson's groups – because we believe that membership in a political party is not necessarily a matter of rent-seeking.  
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3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
We study the impact of SC on work hours decisions using the US General Social Survey 
(GSS) database. The GSS has three useful characteristics. Firstly, and most importantly, it is rich in 
SC indicators (ranging from social contacts to trust to membership in various groups and 
organizations). Secondly, the GSS covers quite a long period of time – more than 25 years – and 
counts more than 45 thousand observations that are representative of the US census regions. This 
helps to control for shocks in different points in time and regions of the US. Finally, the GSS has a 
measure of work hours as well as several other demographic and socio-economic indicators, which 
allow for further important controls. Table 6 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
Their detailed definition can be found in the appendix. 
The GSS also has a few limitations. First, the applied sampling method varies across surveys 
(either for investigating a specific issue or because new and better sampling methods became 
available). Second, the GSS is not a panel but a cross-section: the interviewed subjects change year 
by year. This prevents us from controlling for unobserved personal characteristics. Third, there is no 
direct measure of wages or labor income. The best proxy of labor income available for most 
observations is personal income, which is, however, a rather a poor one because it does not 
distinguish between labor earnings and returns to private assets. Another good proxy is the 
occupational prestige score (OPS), an index of earning capacity developed by sociologists, which 
has been shown to account for a large part of the wage variance. Unfortunately, this index is 
available starting only from 1988, meaning that if we want to use it, we must give up about half of 
the observations of the GSS dataset. This is definitely a serious drawback. Finally, the set of 
questions asked in the GSS has been partly modified from survey to survey. This is due to the GSS 
initial design and its subsequent adjustments. Put simply, the GSS is composed of two parts: a sort 
of “core” – a bunch  of questions that were asked in every survey – and a collection of “modules” – 
groups of topic specific questions – that are associated to some surveys only. Most SC variables are 
available only for a subset of the available observations. Unfortunately, the intersection of these 
subsets only counts about four thousands observations (less than 10% of the total database). This 
implies that if we want to use all available SC variables in the same regression, we are very likely to 
incur in sample selection biases.    
Our empirical strategy tries to cope with all such limitations. The problem of a non-
homogeneous sampling across surveys does not really constitute a serious impediment. Thanks to 




7 The lack of panel observations is a more serious issue because 
unobserved personal traits may play a role in labor supply decisions. A possible solution could be to 
build a pseudo-panel but this would imply a substantial loss of information due to the process of 
constructing representative individuals. It is, moreover, not clear what level of aggregation should 
be used to construct the representative individuals. Therefore, we prefer to apply a simpler cross-
sectional analysis. In any case, although we recognize that unobserved individual characteristics 
may be important, they are not necessarily essential to our study. Our primary aim is to estimate the 
impact of SC on labor supply decision. Thus, the estimations we are interested in would be biased 
by the lack of controls for unobserved individual characteristics only if the same characteristics 
were to affect both labor supply decision and SC. Of course, we cannot exclude that this is the case 
but there is neither any strong evidence nor any well established theory suggesting that it is likely to 
be so.  
Much worse limitations are, instead, the lack of a reliable measure of wages or labor earnings 
and the possible selection bias that can arise if all SC variables are included in the same regression. 
With respect to the former problem, our strategy will be to sidestep it by focusing on the reduced 
form model only. With respect to the latter problem, our strategy will be to run a separate regression 
for each different group of SC variables so as to minimize the loss of observations in each 
regression. Further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of our choices is presented 
below and in the next section, along with the description of the empirical model and the estimations 
results.  
We stress that our objective is not to contribute to the large body of literature which 
investigates the effect of wages, non-labor income or other standard economic variables on the 
supply of labor. Instead, our objective is to estimate the effect of SC on work hours decisions, 
whenever such an effect is direct or goes through other variables. In other words our primary 
interest lies in the estimates of a reduced form model where SC is among the dependent variables. 
In other words, the exact structural model that has generated the reduced form model only 
constitutes a secondary interest for us. This approach greatly simplifies our needs for identifying 
assumptions and, most importantly, substantially helps to cope with the lack of a wage measure.  
In order to highlight what assumptions are crucial to our investigation we introduce first a 
simple structural model of labor supply decisions, which is consistent with the reduced form model 
to be estimated. The model is a system of two equations, i.e.   
                                                 
7  The GSS also provides sample weights that can be used to homogenize the samples. However, weights are partly 
arbitrary constructs and, moreover, they may substantially bias our estimates. Therefore, we prefer not to use them.  
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   h h  = α1X + β1w + γ1Y + δ1SC + ε1                (1) 
 
     w  = α2X + β2Z + γ2Y + δ2SC + ε2
     
(2) 
where hh is the vector of hours worked, X is a matrix of personal characteristics such as gender, age, 
race, education, etc (including dummies for both region of residence and year of interview), w is the 
vector of offered wages, Y is the vector of non-personal incomes, Z is a vector of regional 
unemployment rates (the only data not coming from the GSS but obtained from the National Census 
Bureau), SC is a matrix of SC variables, ε1 and ε2  are jointly normally distributed with zero men, 
variance equal to, respectively, σ1
2 and σ2
2 and covariance equal to σ12.
8 
Notice that, although in (1)-(2) we assume that SC can affect the offered wage w, this is just a 
possibility. In fact, the coefficient δ2  may well be zero and wage be determined only by personal 
and regional characteristics. In other terms, we allow for the possibility of SC to exert a direct 
influence on wages but we do not require it. The same applies to non-personal income Y. Instead, 
we  do assume that offered wage does not affect SC. This is an important assumption for our 
empirical strategy because it assures that a poor control for wages does not bias the estimates 
regarding SC variables.  
From the system (1)-(2) we obtain the following reduced form model 
  h h  = (α1+β1α2)X + β1β2Z + (γ1 + β1γ2)Y + (δ1+β1δ2)SC + β1ε1 + ε1     (3) 
which is better rewritten as 
        hh  = π1X + π2Z + π3Y + π4SC + μ       ( 4 )  
where π1= (α1+β1α2), π2 = β1β2, π3 = (γ2 + β1γ2), π4 = (δ1+β1δ2) and μ = (β1ε2+ε1). Since ε1 and ε2 








As anticipated above, our objective is to estimate (4). We do not attempt to identify the 
structural parameters of the system (1)-(2). Actually, since we lack a reliable measure of w, without 
further assumptions about the structural parameters we are unable to identify them. This further 
motivates our choice to focus on (4) instead of the system (1)-(2). In fact, under the rather weak 
assumption that the “true” structural model is consistent with the reduced form (4), we are able to 
estimate the “gross” – i.e. direct plus indirect – impact of SC on labor supply decisions without the 
need of a measure of w. Besides, there are other advantages. First, we do not need to specify any 
special assumption about the relationship between offered wage and SC or between offered wage 
and non-personal income. Second, we can dispense with the typical problem of sample selection 
                                                 
8   While the stochastic terms of equations (1) and (2) do not need to be independent, the assumption of joint 
normality of ε1 and ε2 is necessary to have a reduced form model with a normally distributed error term.  
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biases due to the impossibility of observing the wage offered to those who have decided not to 
work. Finally, under the assumption that SC is not influenced by w,  we can forget about all 
estimation biases due to omitted variables in equation (2) because we are just interested in the 
estimates of π4 while such biases would affect only the estimates of π1, π2 and π3.  
Of course, this approach also has disadvantages. First, it does not allow us to distinguish 
between the direct effect of SC on work hours and the indirect effect that goes through the offered 
wage. Hence, we will not be able to say whether social capital affects the supply of labor because it 
affects the ratio between the marginal utility of consumption and leisure or because it affects the 
amount of consumption granted by an hour of work. Second, our capability to judge the goodness 
of our control for w is limited by the fact that we do not have an explicit estimate of its impact on 
work hours decisions. However, the latter is not a serious drawback since, as we have already said, 
under the assumption that the offered wage does not affect SC, even a poor control for w is enough 
for obtaining unbiased estimates of π4.  
In the following section, we illustrate the results of five sets of regressions, one for each group 
of SC variables we use: marital status, social contacts, social trust, membership in 
groups/organizations and watching TV. Each group of variables is used in just one set of 
regressions, with the only exception of marital status ones, which are maintained in all regressions. 
The chosen grouping of SC variables, besides being meaningful from a theoretical viewpoint, 
divides the regressors in such a way as to maximize the number of observations used in each set of 
regressions. As anticipated, we do this instead of running a single regression with all SC variables 
in order to avoid sample selection biases. The drawback of such a strategy is that there is a 
systematic omission of variables that are assumed to be relevant and, hence, a possible systematic 
bias of the estimates of SC variables. Nevertheless, this seems to us the best available solution. 
Apart from marital status variables (which in any case are maintained in all regressions), 
correlations among SC variables are rather low (see Table 7), suggesting that the possible bias 
should be, if present, rather small. Moreover, having only a single group of SC variables has the 
further advantage of allowing an easier IV estimation when the risk of endogeneity problems is 
particularly high.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
Our baseline sample is constituted by the GSS interviews conducted between 1976 and 2004, from 
which we have eliminated two types of individuals. The first type are individuals who responded 
that they did not work in the previous week but only due to temporary reasons (e.g. disease,  
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vacation, etc). The second type are individuals who declared to work but to be self-employed. For 
the first type of individuals, we have no information about the hours worked and, hence, we cannot 
use such observations. The second type of individuals are excluded because we have no information 
about the assets they own and, hence, we are not able to control for the work incentives they have 
because they own the firm they work for.
9 
In the first set of regressions – namely 1, 2, 3, 4, 5and 6 – we estimate equation (4), including, 
for what concerns SC variables, only those related to marital status. These regressions have two 
objectives. The first, and main one, is to measure the impact of marital relationships on work hours 
decisions. The second is to put to the test our controls for the offered wage w in order to check how 
crucial our assumption is that w does not affect SC. We do this to have an idea of how informative 
are our estimates of π1, π2 and π3. The test is based on the use of the occupational prestige score 
(OPS) index.
10 We run regressions with and without OPS and then we compare results to check the 
relative performance of our controls for w. Results are shown in Table 2.
11  
Several aspects of the estimates of Regressions 1-6 seem to suggest that our controls for w 
perform as well as the occupational prestige score index. First, the R-square is about .3, which is in 
line with most labor supply studies. Most important, it is almost the same in each pair of regressions 
– all, men and women – substantially showing that the inclusion of the OPS index does not add 
much to the explanation of the observed variance of hours worked. Second, the coefficients of 
regressors not related to the OPS index, such as marital status variables, household size, children, 
non-personal household income, race and age, are not qualitatively affected by the inclusion of the 
OPS index. Therefore, to the extent that the OPS index is a good proxy of offered wages, this 
suggests that these estimates are not biased by omitted variables in equation (2).
12 Last, regional 
unemployment rate has a large coefficient and is highly significant when the OPS index is not 
included, while it has a much smaller coefficient and is definitely not significant when the OPS 
index is included. Since regional unemployment rate is our proxy for the local determinants of 
                                                 
9   Self-employed individuals constitute about 10% of the whole GSS dataset (5,035 observations), so although their 
exclusion is not a major reduction, it is not a negligible one. We run additional regressions (not reported here) in which 
we included self-employed individuals. We found qualitatively similar results.  
10   The OPS index has 88 different scores going from a minimum of 9.97 to a maximum of 90.2. In other words, 88 
categories of professions that are judged by interviewed subjects and whose desirability depends on both material (e.g. 
income, amenities, etc) and immaterial aspects (e.g. psychological gratification, social utility, etc). See, among others, 
Goldthorpe and Hope (1972, 1974) and Williams and Collins (1995).  
11   We perform such a test including only marital status among the SC variables because in this way the number of 
observations is greatest and, moreover, regressors are those most typically used in studies concerning labor supply 
decisions. 
12   Notice that, in every regression which includes the OPS index, the constant term is not significant. This makes the 
comparison of absolute values of coefficients somewhat less reliable. However, the comparison of the relative values 
gives similar results.  
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offered wages, we interpret this result as further evidence that our controls for w are effective. 
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of SC variables. Table 2 shows that marital status 
has a large effect on work hours decisions. From Regression 1, we understand that having been 
married at least once has a positive and large effect on labor supply. In particular, married people 
work about 2.4 hours more than never married ones. Moreover, people at their second or subsequent 
marriage and people experiencing separation or widowhood work about 4 hours per week more than 
people who have never been married or are currently divorced but not remarried. Furthermore, 
Regressions 3 and 5 show that marital status has a rather different impact on the decisions of men 
and women. Married men work almost 8 hours more (almost 9 if at their second or subsequent 
marriage) than never married ones. Separated, divorced and widowed men work about, respectively, 
4.9, 2.3 and 6.2 hours more than never married men. On the contrary, married women work about 
1.8 hours less than never married ones and widows work about 2.8 hours less. Quite interestingly, 
women at their second marriage and women who are currently separated but not remarried work as 
much as never married ones. 
Theses results are somewhat puzzling if we try to interpret them solely in terms of intrinsic 
versus extrinsic SC. In fact, more intrinsic SC in the form of first marriage increases the supply of 
labor (this happens on average and, in particular, for men) and, at the same time, less intrinsic SC in 
the form of separation, widowhood or further marriages (meaning that the previous ones did not 
work very well) increases the supply of labor even more. A better explanation is that marriage is not 
only a matter of relationships but it is also an important economic institution. In the first place, 
marriage often coincides with a new lifestyle that is accompanied by exceptional expenses, which, 
in turn, require more income and, hence, more work. In the second place, a marital relationship 
often entails a form of labor specialization.
13 So if we suppose that marriage requires, on average, 
an extra amount of income, which pushes each partner to work a few extra hours per week, and we 
assume, moreover, that labor specialization induces a reallocation of 5-4 hours of weekly market 
work from women to men (as suggested by Regression 3 and 5), then the figures of Regressions 1, 
3 and 5 tell a coherent story: ceteris paribus, more intrinsic SC in the form of marital relationships 
does, if anything, reduce the supply of labor. Nevertheless, since we cannot support this 
interpretation with further empirical evidence, we conservatively regard the overall result about the 
impact of intrinsic SC in the form of marital relationships as ambiguous for what concerns men and 
as negative for what concerns women. 
                                                 
13   Unfortunately, we do not have measures of time spent on child care or housework but we suspect that we would 
find exactly opposite results with respect to Regressions 3 and 5 – namely that married men do less child care and 
housework than never married ones and vice versa for women (see Aguiar and Hurst (2006) for detailed data on this).  
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The second set of regressions – namely 7, 8, 9 and 10 – investigates the impact of intrinsic SC 
in the form of social contacts. In Regression 7, we have included, alongside the regressors used in 
Regression 1, four dummy variables, which take value 1 if the subject affirmed to spend at least one 
evening per month with, respectively, relatives, neighbors or friends living outside the 
neighborhood and at least one evening per month at a bar or tavern. We interpret the first three 
variables as positive indicators of intrinsic SC, while we view the latter as a negative one. The idea 
is that individuals with poorer relational goods tend to spend more time at bars or similar places, 
trying to compensate for their lack of social contacts.
14 In Regression 8, we add interaction effects 
between the social contact dummies and the dummy indicating that the subject is currently married. 
We do this to control for the possibility that marital relationships may be a substitute for social 
contacts. Regressions 9 and 10 investigate whether men and women are different in this respect. We 
maintain the same regressors used in 8 but run the regressions on samples that include, respectively, 
only men and only women.   
In Table 3, we report the estimates of the SC variables for this second set of regressions. 
Results show that having at least a monthly contact with neighbors goes with a reduction of about 3 
work hours per week; having contacts with relatives and friends outside the neighborhood does not 
have any substantial impact on work hours decisions. On the contrary, spending at least one evening 
per month at a bar goes with almost two 2 additional hours of work per week. The coefficient of the 
interaction effect between marriage and contacts with neighbors is slightly larger than 1 and 
significant, suggesting a certain degree of substitutability between the two. Another possible 
explanation is that the nature of the relationships with neighbors tends to be different for married 
people. Couples may be more likely to interact with neighbors for instrumental reasons (mutual 
child caring, neighborhood monitoring, etc.) or to perceive such contacts as an investment in the 
quality of the environment they have decided to live in. In other words, these relationships may be 
extrinsic instead of intrinsic and, hence, have a different impact on work hours decisions. The 
interaction effect between marriage and evenings spent at a bar offers a different picture. The 
coefficient is rather large (about 1.9) and highly significant.  This suggests that married people 
going to a bar may be an indicator of poor marital relationships or, more in general, of an 
unpleasant relational environment at home (e.g. the Andy Capp syndrome). Incidentally, this 
supports our interpretation of spending evenings at a bar as a proxy of poor intrinsic SC. 
Furthermore, evenings spent with either relatives or friends living outside the neighborhood does 
                                                 
14   This interpretation is supported by the fact that the correlation between spending an evening at a bar and spending 
one with friends or neighbors is positive but rather low. If people were to go to bars accompanied by friends or 
neighbors instead of going alone and in search of company, then we should observe a much larger correlation.     
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not seem to have much impact on work hour decisions. A possible explanation of this result is that 
the two variables are not good indicators of intrinsic SC or are spurious ones. However, we have no 
strong arguments in favor of this interpretation. Again, we adopt a conservative approach and 
conclude that SC in the form of contacts with relatives or friends living outside the neighborhood 
does not affect work hours decisions. Finally, Regressions 9 and 10 suggest that there are no 
substantial differences between men and women.  
The third set of regressions – namely 11, 12 and 13 – investigates the impact of intrinsic SC in 
the form of trust in individuals. Alongside the regressors used in Regressions 1, 3 and 5, we add 
three dummy variables, which take value 1 if the interviewed subject declared to consider, 
respectively, most people to be trustworthy, most people to be helpful or most people to act unfairly 
– i.e. to take advantage of others whenever possible. As for the previous sets of estimations, we run 
separate regressions for all individuals (regression 11), for men only (regression 12) and for women 
only (regression 13). The estimates of the relevant parameters are reported in Table 4.  
Overall, results suggest that intrinsic SC in some forms of trust in individuals does have an 
impact, albeit not a large one, on labor supply decisions. When all individuals are considered, the 
only significant coefficient is that of “unfairness” but it remains small at about -.7. When only men 
are considered, the coefficient becomes somewhat larger but with no qualitative difference. Instead, 
when only women are considered, the coefficient of “unfairness” becomes non-significant, while 
that of “helpfulness” becomes significant and scores about -1.03. In conclusion, although the 
general picture is one of non remarkable influence of social trust on work hours decisions, we see 
that there are differences between men and women. Men seem to work somewhat less if they 
consider other people to behave unfairly, whereas women seem to work less if they consider people 
to be helpful in most situations. This difference is not very relevant in quantitative terms but it may 
be an indication that SC affects the male and female labor supply in different ways. 
The fourth set of regressions – namely 14, 15, 16 and 17 – investigates the impact of SC in 
the form of membership in various types of groups and organizations. We consider the result of 
these estimations our most important test, because group membership allows us to distinguish 
between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated relational activities, respectively Putnam’s groups 
and Olson’s groups.  
Table 5 reports the estimates of the three variables of interest, i.e. the number of memberships 
in Putnam’s groups, in Olson’s groups and in Other groups. The results of Regression 14 indicate 
that membership in an Olson group goes with about 3.6 extra hours of work, while membership in a 
Putnam group is not associated with a substantial change in hours worked; moreover, membership  
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in an Other group is associated with about -1.3 hours of work per week. However, these estimates 
are likely to be unreliable because membership in groups or organizations is clearly endogenous to 
the choice of labor supply. Participating in many group activities, such as volunteering, hobbies, 
sports, etc., also depends on the off-work time. Being part of organizations like unions or 
professional associations is possible, in most cases, only if people work on a regular basis. 
Furthermore, unobserved personal characteristics, such as a strong desire to be involved in some 
activity or a sense of duty, may affect both work hours decisions and group membership decisions.  
Our strategy in this respect is to perform a IV estimation. The instrumental variables that we 
use are the yearly average number of memberships in, respectively, Putnam, Olson and Other 
groups of each US census region. Our fundamental assumption is that yearly average memberships 
affect labor supply decisions only by affecting the likelihood of being a member of some group. 
This may be due to peer effects, regional social norms or just a greater selection of available groups 
and organizations to join. We apply a 2SLS method, where the three instruments are allowed to 
influence membership in anyone of the three types of groups. In Regression 15, we estimate the 
impacts of membership for all individuals. Very interestingly, we find that group membership has a 
dramatic impact on the supply of labor. Membership in a Putnam group decreases weekly work 
time by about 3 hours, while membership in an Olson group increases weekly work time by about 
8.7 hours; membership in an Other group is associated with about -1 hour of weekly work time but 
the coefficient is not significant. These numbers are definitely large and suggest that SC heavily 
affects work hours decisions. In particular, there is sharp difference between intrinsic and purely 
extrinsic SC: the former substantially decreases the supply of labor, while the latter dramatically 
increases it. As long as our assumptions are satisfied, the three instruments that we use are not weak 
ones (in the sense of Stock and Yogo (2003)) and, hence, the risk of biases related to instrument 
weakness is low.
15  
In Regressions 16 and 17, we test for differences between men and women. Unfortunately, 
most coefficients become insignificant, making interpretation less clear. The only significant 
coefficient is that of Olson’s groups for women, which scores about 15.7. The coefficient of Olson’s 
groups for men drops to about .5, being not significant. The coefficient of Putnam’s groups remain 
of the same sign and quite large for both men and women, though not significant. The coefficient of 
Other groups in women’s regression remains negative but becomes sensibly larger than in 
                                                 
15   The  F statistics of our first stage regressions suggest that the three instruments are not weak ones (in the sense of 




16 We interpret these results as evidence that women are more responsive than men to 
SC. In particular, women seem to be much more responsive than men to the labor-increasing effects 
of extrinsic SC, whereas the labor-decreasing effect of intrinsic SC is almost the same for men and 
women. 
Our last set of regressions – namely 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 – investigates the impact of SC 
using the number of hours spent watching TV per week. We interpret this variable as a proxy for 
both the quantity and the quality of relational activities, following Bruni and Stanca (2007). Of 
course, also in this case we face a problem of endogeneity. The time spent watching television 
certainly depends on work hours and, moreover, there may be unobserved personal traits that affect 
both. As an attempt to solve the problem, we again perform a IV estimation. We use the self-
reported degree of confidence in television as an instrument. The fundamental assumption is that 
confidence in television affects the supply of labor only by affecting the decision of how many 
hours of TV are watched.    
Results are shown in Table 6. In Regression 18, we run a standard OLS. As expected, the 
coefficient of watching TV is highly significant but very likely to be downward biased by 
endogeneity problems. In Regression 19, we run a 2SLS with confidence in television as an 
instrument. The coefficient of watching TV becomes very small and not significant. This suggests 
that the only causal relationship between watching TV and the labor supply goes from the latter to 
the former. However, this outcome may be the result of two opposite effects: a positive effect on 
people who watch a few hours of television due to intrinsic SC and a negative effect on people who 
watch TV a lot due to non-relational reasons. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of TV watchers by 
the number of hours per day spent watching TV. Median and modal TV watching is 2 hours per day. 
About 83.4% of the population declares to watching TV not more than 4 hours per day. The 
percentage increases to 90.13 if we consider those who watch TV not more than 5 hours per day. In 
Regression 19, we restrict the sample to the latter group of people. Very interestingly, the coefficient 
now becomes about .25 and significant at the 10% level. In Regression 20, we further restrict the 
sample to those watching TV not more than 4 hours per day and the coefficient increases to .40 and 
becomes significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that our intuition about the two offsetting 
effects may indeed be correct. In Regressions 21 and 22, we explore whether there are differences 
between men and women. We find that the positive impact of television on labor supply is 
substantially due to women.     
 
                                                 
16    Since the constant term in Regression 17 is not significant, the absolute values of coefficients cannot be 




SC has shown to have different effects depending on its intrinsic or purely extrinsic nature. Women 
and men seem to be affected in substantially different ways. The main findings of this paper are:  
1.  more intrinsic SC goes with less hours worked; 
2.  more purely extrinsic SC goes with more hours worked, but only for women; 
3.  our IV estimations suggest that a direction of causation goes from social capital to hours 
worked, though the other direction of causation is not excluded; 
4.  the impact of SC on hours worked is greater for women than men; 
5.  women’s choice of how much to work is heavily and positively affected by purely extrinsic 
SC in the form of membership in Olson’s groups, while men’s is almost unaffected; 
6.  women’s choice of how much to work is partly negatively affected by intrinsic SC in the 
form of trust in individuals, whereas men’s is partly positively affected by it; 
7.  on balance, intrinsic SC in the form of marital relationships appears to negatively affect 
work hours decision for both men and women, though the first marriage seems to increase 
men’s labor supply (this may be due to labor specialization in the household); 
8.  intrinsic SC in the form of social contacts goes with less work hours for both men and 
women; in particular, evenings spent with neighbors and evenings spent at a bar are 
consistent with the previous statement while evenings spent with relatives or friends outside 
the neighborhood have a negligible impact on the work hours; 
9.  television seems to positively affect the supply of labor, but only for women who do not 
watch it more than 6 hours per week.     
 
In the light of these findings we can draw two conclusions. First, as far as intrinsic SC is concerned, 
Bartolini-Bonatti’s thesis that a decline in social capital induces individuals to work more cannot be 
rejected. However, purely extrinsic SC seems to have an opposite effect, though this occurs only for 
women. Second, Putnam’s thesis that the increase in the female participation in the labor market is 
a cause of the decline in SC in the form of social activities may be inverted. In fact, less extrinsic 
SC seems to cause women to work less.  
Furthermore, our results suggest that the decline of social capital may have played a role in 
the increase in market hours worked in US. In the light of the evidence provided by Bartolini, 
Bilancini and Pugno (2007) – who show that the decline in intrinsic social capital is a major 
determinant of the US decrease in reported well-being – one may advance the hypothesis that the 
decline of social capital may contribute to solve one of the main puzzles of the happiness literature: 
why do Americans strive so much for money if money cannot buy happiness? However, before any  
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conclusion in this regard can be reached, additional research is needed at both the empirical and the 
theoretical level.  
Finally, it is worth noting that our results about SC in the form of group membership are 
relevant for theories about social capital and growth. SC, in the form of Putnamian and Olsonian 
groups, has opposite effects on the labor supply which lead respectively to reduction or 
enhancement of economic growth. Notice that these impacts on growth are opposite to the ones 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Weekly hours of work  46506  23.76119  23.04775  0  98 
Female 46510  .5606106  .4963181  0  1 
Age   46344  45.26474  17.48464  18  89 
Black 46510  .1375833  .3444658  0  1 
Other  non-white  race   46510  .0350677  .183953  0  1 
Years of education   46369  12.60765  3.166813  0  20 
Non-personal Household Income   36414  349.5479  562.4338  -1049.74  10383.03 
% of regional  unemployment   38882  .0632316  .018056  .028  .125 
Occupational Prestige Score  23353  43.57393  13.70669  17  86 
Number of children   46351  1.964316  1.812595  0  8 
Household size   46504  2.730346  1.539986  1  16 
Married   46502  .555417  .4969248  0  1 
2+ marriage   46502  .1054148  .3070905  0  1 
Separated 46502  .1161025  .3203513  0  1 
Divorced 46502  .0349447  .1836418  0  1 
Widowed 46502  .1003398  .3004557  0  1 
At least one evening a month with relatives  26923  .5389815  .4984874  0  1 
At least one evening a month with neighbors  26892  .364086  .4811819  0  1 
At least one evening a month with friends  26905  .4239361  .4941896  0  1 
At least one evening a month at bar  26869  .1673304  .3732775  0  1 
Generally trusts people (yes  or depends)  29496  .393172  .4884627  0  1 
Considers people unfair (yes  or depends)  29684  .3667969  .4819386  0  1 
Considers people helpful (yes  or depends)  29782  .4960043  .4999924  0  1 
# of Putnam's group memberships  20444  1.185923  1.416396  0  9 
# of Olson's group memberships  20536  .3643845  .6024991  0  4 
# of other group memberships  19985  .2117088  .459382  0  3 
Hours TV per week   27820  20.75014  16.04603  0  168  
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Table 2. Occupational prestige score as a proxy for earning capability 
Total Hours Worked per week  1 - All  2 – All + OPS 3 - Men  4- Men + OPS 5 -  Women  6 – Women + OPS 
Period  1976-2004 1988-2004 1976-2004 1988-2004 1976-2004  1988-2004 




     






































































































































































































Number of obs  28520 16765 12560  7380  15960  9385 
F statistic  467.44 348.75 190.95 148.52 241.23  190.15 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared   0.3134  0.3129  0.3296  0.3380  0.2710  0.2759 
Root MSE  18.44 18.498  18.316 18.396 17.971  18.097 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors; all regressions include dummies for years and region of residence. 
*significant at 10% 
**significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Social contacts and hours worked  
Total Hours Worked per week  7 - All  8 - All  9 – Men  10 - Women









































































































Number of obs  16759 16759  7334  9425 
F statistic  295.66 271.14 109.57  145.72 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared  0.3259 0.3266 0.3401  0.2883 
Root MSE  18.235 18.228 18.256  17.61 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors; all regressions include dummies for years and region of residence. 
*significant at 10% 
**significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Social trust and hours worked 
Total Hours Worked per week  11 - All  12 - Men  13- Women 
Period 1976-2004  1976-2004  1976-2004 
























Number of obs  16991 7618  9373 
F statistic  289.09 121.26 146.08 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared  0.3244 0.3407 0.2826 
Root MSE  18.244 18.002 17.828 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors; all regressions include dummies for years and region of residence. 
*significant at 10% 
**significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 5. Group membership and hours worked 
Total Hours Worked per week  14 - All  15 – All-IV 16 – Men-IV  17 - Women-IV
Period 1976-2004  1976-2004 1976-2004  1976-2004 
































Number of obs  11885 11885 5182  6703 
F statistic  216.36 192.62   86.46  83.53 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared  0.3212   0.2880  0.3085   0.1985 
Root MSE  18.313 18.756  18.487  18.725 
Note: OLS and 2SLS with robust standard errors; all regressions include dummies for years and region of residence. 
*significant at 10% 
**significant at 5% 








Table 6. Hours watching tv and hours worked 
Total Hours Worked per week  18 - All  19 – All  
IV-ConfTV
20 –  <36 hours
 per week, IV 
21 –  <29 hours
 per week, IV 
21 –  Men, <29  
hours per week, IV 
22 – Women <29  
hours per week, IV
Period 1976-2004  1976-2004  1976-2004  1976-2004  1976-2004  1976-2004 
Hours tv per week   -.2576945*** 
(23.29) 






















Obs  18567   12425  11287  10448  4677  5771 
F statistic  350.44 221.26  180.54  156.15  67.61  41.51 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-squared  0.3531 0.3207  0.2827  0.2619  0.3101  0.2028 
Root MSE  17.884 18.22  18.473  18.647  17.872  18.433 
Note: OLS and 2SLS with robust standard errors; all regressions include dummies for years and region of residence. 
*significant at 10% 
**significant at 5% 
***significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Hours Watching TV per Day 
 


































































































              










At least once a 
month with 
 friends 
0.0997 0.1385 1.0000 
 
At least once a 
month at bar 
 





-0.0389 -0.0117  0.0182  0.0097  1.0000 
 
Considers 
people unfair  
 
0.0158 0.0258 0.0073  0.0386  -0.3474  1.0000   
Considers 
people helpful  
 
-0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0015  -0.0383  0.3364  -0.4290    1.0000 
 
# of Putnam's 
groups 
 
0.0275 0.0785 0.0879  -0.0035  0.1571  -0.1309    0.1271  1.0000 
 
# of Olson's 
groups 
 
-0.0221 0.0082  0.0641  0.0690  0.1301  -0.0919    0.0902  0.3289 1.0000 
 
# of other 
groups 
 
-0.0227 0.0454  0.0364  0.0245  0.0847  -0.0776    0.0512  0.2195 0.1305  1.0000  
Hours tv per 
week  
 






Definition and Source of Variables 
The U.S. General Social Survey (dataset 1972-2004) 
 
Female: 1 if subject is female 
Age: number of years since born 
Age square: age to the power of 2 
Black: 1 if respondent defines himself afro-American 
Other non-white: 1 if respondent neither defines himself as white nor afro-American 
Years of education: number of years the respondent declared to have attended school 
Non-Personal Household Income: reported household income minus personally earned income, both as provided in the 
GSS (variables name: coninc, conrinc) 
Occupational Prestige Score:  index of earning capability and working status  as provided in the GSS (variable name: 
prestg80) 
Household size: number of reported household members 
Number of Children: reported number of children 
Married: 1 if respondent reports to be currently married 
2nd+ Marriage: 1 if respondent reports to be married but not for the first time 
Separated: 1 if respondent reports to be currently separated 
Divorced: 1 if respondent reports to be currently divorced 
Widowed: 1 if respondent reports to be currently widowed 
Monthly with relatives: 1 if respondent reports to spend at least one evening per month with relatives 
Monthly with neighbors: 1 if respondent reports to spend at least one evening per month with neighbors 
Monthly with friends: 1 if respondent reports to spend at least one evening per month with friends living outside her 
neighborhood 
Monthly at bar: 1 if respondent reports to spend at least one evening per month at bar or tavern 
Others can be trusted: 1 if respondent considers people to be trustworthy (0 is associated with answers “not 
trustworthy” and “depends”) 
Others are helpful: 1 if respondent considers people to be helpful (0 is associated with answers “not helpful” and 
“depends”) 
Others are unfair: 1 if respondent considers people to be unfair and to take advantage whenever possible (0 is 
associated with answers “fair” and “depends”) 
Putnam’s Group: number of memberships of service groups, church organizations, sport clubs, art and literature clubs, 
national organizations, hobby clubs, fraternal groups and youth associations 
Olson’s Group: number of memberships of fraternity associations, unions, professional organizations and farm 
organizations 
Other Groups: number of memberships of veteran associations, political party and “other groups”  
 
Description of the typology of groups and organizations: 
service groups:  non-profit associations aimed at providing a service which is considered insufficiently supplied;   
church organizations: associations created by a church for social activities; 
sport clubs: non-profit associations supporting sport activities;  
art and literature clubs: small associations for studying and spreading art and literature; 
national organizations: association based on national/ethnic homogeneity  for social activities; 
hobby clubs: non-profit associations centered aroud a single off-work activity; 
fraternal groups: non -profit association based on mutual help and a common social purpose;  
youth associations: age-based associations for social activities of young people; 
fraternity associations: brotherood pursuing the interest of the members; 
unions: labor unions; 
professional organizations: association of professionals (not farmers);  
farm organizations: association of farmers; 
veteran associations: association of ex-member of military forces who have been in a war; 
political party: any political group which has an organizational structure (not just political movements); 
“other groups”: residual category (not fitting in any of the previous ones). 
 
US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
% regional unemployment: yearly average unemployment in US census regions.  